



Gx Delivery Legitimacy: Compliance by Members

MARINA LARIONOVA & ANDREY SHELEPOV¹

Introduction

The G8, G20 and BRICS (Gx²) capability for global governance is often assessed based on the institutional performance of the global governance functions of deliberation, direction-setting, decision-making, delivery and the development of global governance. Deliberation is regarded as face-to-face discussions among the members encoded in their collective documents. Direction-setting is defined as a collective affirmation of shared principles and norms. Decision-making is understood as credible, clear, collective commitments with sufficient precision and obligation. Delivery is considered as stated compliance with collective decisions. Finally, global governance development is understood as a capability of a particular Gx institution to use other international institutions and create its own global governance mechanisms (Kirton, 2013: 37-39). All global governance functions should be properly balanced in the institution discourse for successful implementation of its mission. Deliberation and direction-setting provide foundation for making decisions and subsequent delivery on them. This article focuses on the Gx delivery function as an important indicator of international institutions' effectiveness and, in particular, on the delivery legitimacy.

¹ Dr. Marina Larionova (larionova-mv@ranepa.ru) is Head of the Center for International Institutions Research (CIIR) of the Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration (RANEPa). Mr. Andrey Shelepov (shelepov-av@ranepa.ru) is a Lead Analyst at the Center for International Institutions Research (CIIR) of the Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration (RANEPa).

² Gx is applied in the article to all the three groups: G8, G20 and BRICS. It is also applied to G7.

Critics frequently argue that G8, G20 and BRICS are just talking shops incapable of implementing concrete decisions, while the world where risks transcend national and generational borders needs the international community³ to scale up collective action on global problems. In the absence of global enforcement authorities with appropriate powers to forge cooperation and accountability (Otker-Robe, 2014), much weight is placed on plurilateral summitry institutions' responsibility for delivery on the collective pledges. Commitments made by the institutions (concrete and publicly agreed decisions), delivery on the commitments (compliance performance) and outcomes (policy changes at the international and/or national level) constitute the output dimension of legitimacy. Legitimacy, especially its output dimension, correlates closely with effectiveness. Effectiveness is understood as institutions' capacity to agree collective commitments, deliver on the pledges made and exert policy changes which help solve collective problems.⁴

Accurate data on the Gx compliance with the decisions the leaders make collectively is needed to analyze the delivery. To assess compliance performance, the analysis was carried out using comparative data on the number of commitments made by the three institutions in 2009-2013 and the level of institutional compliance, distribution of commitments and compliance across issue areas, and individual compliance by member states. However, comparative assessments of the Gx performance using compliance data should be made with the caveat that the core missions of these three institutions are different, just as commitments they make. Moreover, the groups' collective economic power and representativeness legitimacy are also different. Thus pure comparative statistics on compliance performance cannot be interpreted directly as the institution's higher effectiveness in addressing particular global governance issues. The institution's collective economic power and representativeness legitimacy should be taken into consideration as factors directly impacting their effectiveness and output (or delivery) legitimacy. Thus in assessing the delivery legitimacy of the three institutions their average compliance scores were adjusted using an integral effectiveness indicator. The indicator includes the total GDP of each institution's membership as a proxy for decision implementation impact on global governance issues and total population as a measure of institution's

³ The international community is a collection of global standard setters and regulators, international financial institutions, global cooperation organizations, global media, global civil society and the global scientific community.

⁴ The definitions of effectiveness and the output dimension of legitimacy draws on the paper by Gnath, Mildner and Schmucker (2012)

representativeness. Hence delivery legitimacy is understood as an institution's legitimacy derived from its compliance with the pledges made, multiplied by the indicator of collective economic power and representation.

The period of the three institutions' comparative analysis terminates in 2014, given that on March 2, 2014 G7 leaders announced the suspension of their participation in preparations for the Sochi Summit and the Group reverted to the G7 format, holding the first in the new series G7 meeting in Brussels on June 4-5, 2014.

This paper first describes the methodology used for analysis. Second it looks at the overall number of commitments made by the three institutions and their distribution across issue areas. Third, it analyzes the dynamics of compliance with these commitments and provides comparison of the institutions' performance by issue areas. Fourth, the authors examine the compliance of G8 and BRICS members with the commitments made within the G20, as an institution integrating the members of both as caucus groups. Fifth, the paper attempts to assess the Gx delivery legitimacy by integrating compliance performance with GDP and population indicators of the three institutions.

Methodology

This paper puts three institutions within the same assessment paradigm on the basis of examining compliance with the commitments made at the summits, and assessing the Gx delivery legitimacy by integrating compliance performance with the GDP and population indicators of the three institutions.

Assessing compliance with the commitments

The compliance studies are based on the methodology developed by the G8 Research Group, which has been monitoring G8 compliance since 1996. It was adopted for monitoring G20 since its inception at the leaders' level in 2008 and for monitoring BRICS since the 2011 Sanya Summit. The methodology ensures consistency across members, commitments and presidencies and allows making comparative assessments of G8, G8 and BRICS performance.

Commitments for analysis are selected from the documents adopted by leaders at the summits. Commitments are defined as discrete, specific, publicly expressed, collectively agreed to statements of intent; a "promise" or "undertaking" by summit members that they will undertake future actions to move toward, meet or adjust to meet an identified welfare target (Kirton et al., 2014).

Compliance assessment deals with priority commitments from each G8, G20 and BRICS summit. Priority commitments are those that best capture what the summit as a whole did on the decision-making dimension of its global governance. Due to the large number of commitments that appear in the leaders' documents (for instance, 281 commitments were adopted at the St Petersburg G20 Summit), it is difficult to assess every commitment for compliance. Therefore, only commitments that reflect the essence of the summit documents in a reasonably representative way are chosen for compliance analysis. Thus, the selection represents the priorities of the summit and replicates the breakdown of issue areas and the proportion of commitments in each one. The sample is also balanced to allow for comparison with past and future summits. Priority commitments should be chosen that apply to various subsets of countries within the group. The ability to commit fully to the commitment within a year is taken into account to ensure relevance of the results. The commitments should meet some additional criteria, such as performance measurability and significance as identified by the research team and relevant experts (Kirton et al., 2014).

Compliance is understood as national government action geared towards the domestic implementation of the necessary formal legislative and administrative regulations designed to execute summit commitments. Compliance is assessed according to the criteria of official reaffirmation of a summit commitment; internal bureaucratic review and representation; budgetary and resource allocations made or changed; new or altered programs, legislation and regulations.

This methodology uses a three-level measurement scale. Full or almost full compliance with a specific commitment is assigned a score of +1. A score of -1 indicates complete or nearly complete failure to implement a particular commitment. A score of 0 is given for "inability to commit" or "work in progress". An "inability to commit" is a hypothetical situation referring to factors that impede implementation and cannot be controlled by the government of a state assessed for compliance. A "work in progress" describes initiatives that have been launched by a government but have not yet been completed by the time of the next summit, and whose results therefore cannot be measured and assessed. Compliance scores of -1 and 0 do not necessarily imply an unwillingness of a government to comply. In some cases policy actions need multiple compliance cycles to be fully implemented and subsequently measured.

After getting individual compliance scores, average scores for each commitment and member, as well as an average score for the summit are calculated. These scores can range between -1 and +1.

The analysis draws on the data presented in the G8, G20 and BRICS compliance reports prepared by the University of Toronto and the International Organizations Research Institute of the National Research University Higher School of Economics (IORI HSE) for 2009-2013 summits. The period is chosen based on the timing of G8, G20 and BRICS concurrent existence. 2008 is neglected as the G20 Washington compliance report covers a single commitment on anti-protectionism. It should be also mentioned that BRICS compliance data are available only for 2011-2013 summits.

Assessing delivery legitimacy

To assess the delivery legitimacy of G8, G20 and BRICS, compliance scores are adjusted by an integral indicator of G8, G20 and BRICS decisions implementation effectiveness in addressing global governance challenges. The concept used in this article assumes that differences in the effectiveness of the Gx depend on the share of the global economy they affect through their actions, and the number of people they directly create public goods for. Thus, the integral indicator is a product of the two sub indicators reflecting relative economic power of the institutions and their representativeness. The first one is estimated on the basis of the institution PPP-based GDP ratio, reflecting its role in the world economy, and the second one is calculated on the basis of the population ratio, illustrating the representativeness of each institution. PPP-based estimates of the GDP were used in the analysis as they are not subject to short-term market fluctuations, remaining relatively stable over time, and better reflect the real welfare in the countries and their economic attractiveness compared to other indicators. Compliance scores adjusted by the integral indicator for each institution show their relative capability to make and subsequently implement decisions that can address global challenges. Thus, these adjusted scores take into account both compliance data and effectiveness factors and are perceived as proxies for the Gx delivery legitimacy.

The delivery legitimacy indicator (DLI_i) is the product of an average compliance score and an integral indicator of GDP and population.

To ensure the data consistency, G8 sub indicators for GDP (I_{G8}^{GDP}) and population (I_{G8}^p) were set as equal to 1.

$$I_{G8}^{GDP} = I_{G8}^p = 1$$

G20 and BRICS sub indicators for GDP (I_i^{GDP}) and population (I_i^p) are estimated in relation to those of G8. Thus G8 and BRICS sub indicators are calculated as follows:

$$I_{G20}^{GDP} = \frac{GDP_{G20}}{GDP_{G8}}$$

$$I_{BRICS}^{GDP} = \frac{GDP_{BRICS}}{GDP_{G8}}$$

$$I_{G20}^p = \frac{P_{G20}}{P_{G8}}$$

$$I_{BRICS}^p = \frac{P_{BRICS}}{P_{G8}}$$

where p is a total population of all members of a particular institution, GDP is their total PPP GDP.

The integral indicators (I_i^{int}) of the three institutions are calculated as follows:

$$I_i^{\text{int}} = I_{G20}^{GDP} * I_{G20}^p$$

$$I_{G8}^{\text{int}} = I_{G8}^{GDP} * I_{G8}^p$$

$$I_{BRICS}^{\text{int}} = I_{BRICS}^{GDP} * I_{BRICS}^p$$

The delivery legitimacy indicators for the three institutions (I_i) are calculated based on the following formula:

$$DLI_i = I_i^{\text{int}} * c_i.$$

Where (c_i) is an average compliance score of an institution.

The approach allows to assess the three institutions' legitimacy as legitimacy derived from their compliance with the pledges made, multiplied by the indicator of collective economic power and representation.

Compliance performance: delivery on commitments

G8, G20 and BRICS commitments dynamics


Although the importance of G20 and BRICS in the system of global governance has recently been increasing, they still perform less effectively in terms of

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delivery on commitments than the G8. At the same time, a significant gap exists between decision-making and delivery (compliance performance) in all of the institutions.

On the average number of concrete commitments made in 2009-2014 the G8 (175 commitments) slightly surpasses the G20 (168 commitments), and both of them leave BRICS with an average of 33 commitments per summit far behind (Figure 1). The dynamics of the commitments number is mixed for G8 and G20. In Muskoka, the number of G8 commitments dropped to 73 from 254 registered in L'Aquila. This drop can be attributed to the G8-G20 division of labour, especially sharply emphasized within the Canadian dual G8-G20 presidency in 2010. At the same time, the figure for the G20 remained relatively stable in 2009-2010. Starting from 2011 both institutions demonstrated similar trends, with the number of commitments increasing dramatically in 2011, falling down in 2012, and going up again in 2013. As for BRICS, steady, positive dynamics of the number of commitments have been observed in 2009-2013. However, peaking at 47 in 2013 it was still more than four times lower than the figure for G8 and G20.⁵

Figure 1. G8, G20 and BRICS commitments, 2009-2013.



Distribution of Gx commitments across action areas reflects the core missions of the three institutions (Table 1). Being a key global forum for economic cooperation, G20 decision making is focused on macroeconomic

⁵ It should be noted that in Fortaleza (2014) the BRICS leaders agreed a record 68 commitments, but the summit falls beyond the study period.

policy and financial regulation areas, including such recurring commitments as growth-friendly fiscal consolidation, flexible exchange rates, structural reforms, measures to tackle unemployment, Basel standards for banking capital and liquidity, over-the-counter derivatives, systemically important financial institutions, and measures to address tax avoidance. The G20 also consistently makes commitments on resisting protectionism in trade and investment, and reforming global financial institutions. G20 commitments from other areas aim to address climate change, phasing out inefficient fossil fuel subsidies, fighting crime and corruption. Development cooperation is focused on such issues as infrastructure investment, social protection floors, food security and sustainable agriculture, remittances, financial inclusion, etc. G20 increasingly make commitments to monitor and review progress they make on the agreed pledges.

The commitments of BRICS as a group of major emerging economies mainly fall into the areas relevant for these countries. BRICS focus on practical cooperation and concrete measures to stimulate economic recovery as reflected in the large share of trade and development commitments. Decisions on international cooperation and international institutions reform constitute more than 10 percent, reflecting the members' strife for modernization of the governance architecture, so as to better reflect the increasing weight of emerging markets and developing countries in the world economy. At the same time, within BRICS each presidency's priorities substantially influence the breakdown of commitments. For instance, commitments made during the Russian presidency in 2009 mainly focused on energy and agriculture. Brasilia retained energy issues as a priority, while adding development to the agenda. The summit in Sanya resulted in the adoption of numerous commitments on international cooperation and climate change. The New Delhi and Durban summits addressed regional security as a priority, and the South African summit also dealt with development issues, regional integration and infrastructure development.

The G8 agenda is very broad. Macroeconomic decisions focus on the advanced economies' priorities. A lot of attention is given to development and climate change each area totalling about 10 percent of the G8 decisions. Regional security, nuclear non-proliferation, anti-corruption and fighting terrorism constitute significant part of the G8 decisions.

Commitments on development, trade, energy, agriculture, macroeconomic policy and financial regulation are regularly made by all institutions examined.

Overall, each of the institutions examined has its own core agenda, as reflected by the breakdown of their commitments. At the same time, distribu-

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tion of commitments depends not only on the mission and capabilities of a particular institution, but also on the priorities of the presidencies and the demand for global governance.

Table 1. Distribution of G8, G20 and BRICS commitments across issue areas, 2009-2013, %

Issue area	G8	G20	BRICS
Macroeconomic policy	5.8	26.7	7.4
Finance	5.1	13.7	2.5
International financial institutions reform	0.7	7.1	9.2
Trade	6.7	7.5	12.9
Development	10.9	10.6	12.3
Energy	6.4	6.9	10.4
Food and agriculture	5.4	4.8	3.1
Socioeconomic	0.6	3.2	4.3
Climate change	8.5	3.7	6.7
International cooperation	1.1	3.2	10.4
Accountability	2.5	2.8	0.6
Crime and corruption	6.2	5.0	
Environment	2.2	0.4	
Labor and employment	0.2	4.0	
Good governance	4.9	0.1	
Health	3.5		1.2
Human rights	0.9		1.2
Science and education	0.8		1.8
Regional security	7.1		8.6
Terrorism	5.7		2.5
Natural disasters	0.2		1.8
Non-proloferation	8.3		0.6
Information and communication	1.9		1.2
Nuclear safety	0.6		
Peacekeeping and peacebuilding	1.3		
Transparency	2.4		
Green growth		0.3	
Culture			0.6
Sport			0.6
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0

Delivery on commitments

An institution's effectiveness is based on its ability to deliver on the commitments made. In this regard, the G8, G20 and BRICS comparative compliance performance is surely more important for analysis than the number of commitments made.

The G8 has got well-established delivery mechanisms. After the establishment of the G20 at the leaders' level G8 compliance scores declined slightly for a brief period getting back to normal after Muskoka. Compliance data for the G8 are very stable, with an average score of 0.54 for the examined period; it was 0.53 in Aquila, 0.46 in Muskoka and 0.54 in Deauville. Following a peak of 0.60 in Camp David, the figure reached 0.57 in Lough Erne.

The G20 compliance performance is mixed so far (Figure 2). Following the Toronto Summit, when compliance stood at a score of 0.28 (a bit higher than 0.24 for the Pittsburgh Summit commitments and the London results of 0.23), the figure rose to 0.50 in Seoul, 0.54 in Cannes and 0.57 in Los Cabos. However, it dropped to 0.44 in St Petersburg. The G20 average of 0.40 is thus substantially lower than the G8 average compliance performance of 0.54.


The average compliance score for BRICS (0.41) is almost equal to that of the G20. However, adequate comparison of compliance effectiveness between these institutions can hardly be made, as compliance data is available for only three BRICS summits and the results were mixed. The BRICS average score was relatively high for Sanya and Durban commitments (0.48 for both summits), but the New Delhi figure of 0.28 was almost twice lower.

Despite the growing number of commitments made by the three institutions, their compliance performance has been improving. This can be explained by the formation of institutional culture in G20 and BRICS and the growing awareness of compliance importance for successfully addressing global challenges, but also for proving their legitimacy. A positive trend was also observed in the division of labour between the G8 and G20, which resulted in the G20's emergence as a premier global economic cooperation forum and the G8's greater focus on political, security and development issues.

Overall, G8 average compliance scores are substantially higher than those of the G20 and BRICS. Although an upward trend in G20 and BRICS compliance scores is observed, their delivery on the commitments made is still considerably weaker than that of the G8.

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
Figure 2. Compliance with the G8, G20 and BRICS commitments, 2009-2013.



Compliance by issue areas

Given the different nature of G8, G20 and BRICS, priority commitments selected for assessing compliance represent different policy areas. However, the period of 5 years used in this paper allows comparing compliance scores in the main areas reflecting the priority issues of G8 and G20. Compliance track record for BRICS is less clear, as the statistics for this institution include the data from only three compliance reports.





Generally delivery on the commitments is higher in the areas constituting the core of the institutions' agenda (Table 2). For instance, the G8 performed relatively well on commitments related to fighting terrorism, protecting the environment, addressing non-proliferation and natural disasters. The G20 delivered better on macroeconomic and employment commitments, including those related to fiscal consolidation, flexible exchange rates and policies to cut unemployment. At the same time, some commitments reiterated at each summit, for example, in the areas of trade (anti-protectionism) and energy (phasing out inefficient fossil fuel subsidies), remain largely unaddressed. BRICS achieved moderate success in many of the action areas examined, with the highest average scores on development (supporting infrastructure investment and industrial development in Africa), energy (promoting clean technologies) and climate change (implementing the Cancun Agreements), and visibly lower success on macroeconomic policies and regional security.



Compliance with some priority commitments was a challenge. For instance, G8 results were mixed in the areas of good governance and health, where the essence of commitments selected for monitoring changed from summit to summit reflecting new risks and sometimes included decisions difficult to comply with as their implementation depended not only on the institution's members, but on other stakeholders such as international organizations and/or third countries.

Finally, compliance in some areas lags behind in all three institutions. These include trade, where neither G8 members, nor emerging economies from the broader G20 have succeeded in fighting protectionism; development, climate change and anti-corruption, where progress in implementing coordinated policies has been limited; and financial regulation, where scores are high for the broad G8 commitments, while concrete decisions agreed to within the G20 have often remained unaddressed.

Thus, average compliance performance results across issue areas are mixed for all of the institutions considered. However there is a common trend. While delivery on core priorities is increasing from summit to summit, compliance with new commitments proves challenging. Implementation of decisions that are not in line with some member states' national interests is often poor.



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Table 2. G8, G20 and BRICS compliance by issue areas

	G8					G20								BRICS				
	Aquila 2009	Muskoka 2010	Deauville 2011	Camp David 2012	Lough Erne 2013	Average	London 2009	Pittsburgh 2009	Toronto 2010	Seoul 2010	Cannes 2011	Los Cabos 2012	St Petersburg 2013	Average	Sanya 2011	New Delhi 2012	Durban 2013	Average
Trade	-0.78 ^a	0.22	0.67	0.56	0.59	0.25	0.5	0.1	0.15	-0.05	0.25	0.25	-0.35	0.12	0.4	0	1	0.47
Development	0.33	0.67	0.59	-0.11	0.22	0.34	0.15	-0.05	0.15	0.6	0.33	0.78	0.17	0.30	0.6	0.4	0.6	0.53
Macroeconomic policies	0.89	n/a	0.89	0.74	0.78	0.83	0.35	0.7	0.71	0.57	0.44	0.68	0.6	0.58	n/a	n/a	0.2	0.20
Financial regulation	0.67	n/a	n/a	n/a	0.67	0.67	0	0.15	0.1	0.63	0.71	0.46	0.35	0.34	0.4	n/a		0.40
Climate change	0.64	0	0.56	0.11	0.23	0.31	n/a	0.75	n/a	n/a	0.7	-0.2	0.42	0.50	0.8	0.2		0.50
Crime and corruption	0.67		-0.22	0.44	0.33	0.31		0.3	-0.2	0.45	-0.1	0.15	0.12					
Food and agriculture	0.89	0.22	0.11	0.72		0.49		0.15		0.55	0.35	0.8	0.46					
IFReform	0.56			0.78		0.67		0.05	0.9	0.5			0.48		0.2	0.2		0.20
Energy	0.67			0.5		0.59		0.05	0.59	0.79		0.55	0.50			0.6		0.60
Health	0.39	-0.08	-0.11	1	0.89	0.42												
Regional security	0.63	0.95	0.22		0.73	0.63											0.2	0.20
Terrorism	0.78	0.78	0.56		0.67	0.70											0.4	0.40
Good governance	0	0.56	1	0		0.39												
Labor and employment				0.78		0.78					1	0.88	0.94					
Socioeconomic									0.9	0.7	0.55		0.72					
Non-proliferation		0.89	0.85	0.95		0.90												
Environment	0.89					0.89					0.58		0.58					
International cooperation									0.05	0.25			0.15					

Table 2. G8, G20 and BRICS compliance by issue areas (Continued)

	G8						G20								BRICS			
	Aquila 2009	Muskoka 2010	Deauville 2011	Camp David 2012	Lough Erne 2013	Average	London 2009	Pittsburgh 2009	Toronto 2010	Seoul 2010	Cannes 2011	Los Cabos 2012	St Petersburg 2013	Average	Sanya 2011	New Delhi 2012	Durban 2013	Average
Information and communication			0.73		0.67	0.73												
Education	0.56					0.56												
Nuclear safety		0.67				0.67												
Natural disasters		0.78				0.78												
Accountability			0.44			0.44												
Transparency					0.91	0.91												

a Figures present average compliance scores for commitments in the particular issue area and are derived from the 2010-2014 G8, G20 and BRICS compliance reports.

G8 and BRICS compliance within the G20

Although the G8, G20 and BRICS missions and priorities, as well as the timing of their summits, are largely different, G8 and BRICS members are all involved in the G20, and consequently should comply with commitments made within this forum. Thus, looking at their compliance performance within the G20 commitments and comparing these both with their results in G8 and BRICS, and with the compliance score of non-G8 and non-BRICS G20 members (Table 3), provide additional insights into Gx delivery performance.

Within the G20 the G8 compliance is significantly and consistently higher than that of the other G20 members. Moreover, the average score of 0.59 is even higher than the G8 compliance with its own commitments over the same period of the institutions' coexistence (0.54). On the contrary, BRICS average compliance within the G20 equals 0.28, while the figure for the BRICS own commitments is 0.41. Such performance supports two basic ideas. First, advanced G8 economies generally deliver better on their commitments than non-G8 G20 members. Second, the implementation by the BRICS of very concrete economic and financial commitments, which constitute the core of the G20 agenda, is more challenging than complying with their own decisions, which are broader and less specific in character. Data in Table 3 illustrate the difference in performance among G20 members. Within the G8 group, Italy, Japan and Russia on average lag behind other members. Within the non-G8 members, Australia (the only advanced economy in this group) is a top-performer, while Indonesia, Saudi Arabia and Turkey have got the lowest average compliance scores.

Table 3. G20 compliance, 2009-2013

	London	Pittsburgh	Toronto	Seoul	Cannes	Los Cabos	St.Petersburg	Average
Canada	0.6	0.63	0.75	0.69	0.73	0.75	0.44	0.66
France	0.8	0.63	0.63	0.77	0.6	0.69	0.69	0.69
Germany	0.8	0.63	0.5	0.54	0.67	0.56	0.75	0.64
Italy	0	0.13	0.5	0.77	0.8	0.19	0.44	0.40
Japan	0.2	0.5	0.5	0.54	0.47	0.5	0.31	0.43
Russia	0.4	0.38	0.13	0.58	0.6	0.63	0.44	0.45
United Kingdom	1	0.5	0.5	0.77	0.87	0.81	0.75	0.74

Table 3. G20 compliance, 2009-2013 (Continued)

	London	Pittsburgh	Toronto	Seoul	Cannes	Los Cabos	St Petersburg	Average
United States	0.4	1	0.38	0.38	0.53	0.81	0.69	0.60
European Union	0.6	0.38	0.63	0.83	0.85	0.75	0.63	0.67
G8	0.53	0.53	0.50	0.65	0.68	0.63	0.57	0.59
G8 average	0.59							
Argentina	-0.6	-0.13	0	-0.08	0	0.31	0.06	-0.06
Australia	0.6	0.5	0.63	0.85	0.67	0.94	0.63	0.69
Brazil	0.2	-0.63	0.38	0.42	0.6	0.56	0.31	0.26
China	-0.4	0.13	0.38	0.42	0.53	0.38	0.19	0.23
India	-0.4	-0.38	-0.38	0.42	0.6	0.5	0.63	0.14
Indonesia	-0.4	-0.63	-0.13	0.33	0.14	0.47	0.5	0.04
Mexico	0	0.25	-0.13	0.31	0.67	0.69	0.38	0.31
Korea	0	0.75	0.5	0.75	0.6	0.63	0.38	0.52
Saudi Arabia	0.2	-0.13	-0.13	0.17	0.21	0.5	0.06	0.13
South Africa	0.4	0.63	-0.25	0.25	0.47	0.47	0.25	0.32
Turkey	0.2	-0.25	0	0.17	0.2	0.25	0.25	0.12
non-G8 G20	-0.02	0.01	0.08	0.36	0.43	0.52	0.33	0.24
non-G8 G20 average	0.24							
G20	0.23	0.24	0.28	0.5	0.54	0.57	0.44	0.40
G20 average	0.40							
BRICS	0.04	0.03	0.05	0.42	0.56	0.51	0.36	0.28
BRICS average	0.28							

Thus, the G8's higher compliance capacity is confirmed by the G20 performance data. The G8 countries' average compliance within the G20 is higher than their performance in the G8, while the opposite is true for the BRICS. This can be attributed to the nature of the G20 pledges which present an implementation challenge for G20 developing countries. The assumption is confirmed by the fact that non-G8 members' average compliance performance with G20 commitments is even lower than that of BRICS. The average for the period data may raise a concern over the contradiction which the G20 seemingly presents: the institution boasts enhanced representation bringing together advanced and developing countries. However, its delivery is mostly driven by the advanced economies. To refute this concern, it can be argued that the data should be considered dynamically. There is a tangible positive trend in the non-

G8 members' compliance performance with G20 commitments: having started with -0.02 for London it steadily rose reaching a peak of 0.52 for Los Cabos. Though it slumped to 0.33 for Saint-Petersburg, developing countries' contribution to G20 delivery is clearly increasing.

To sum up, the analysis of compliance revealed that G8 compliance performance is generally higher as compared to the G20 and BRICS, with the G8 average at 0.54 over the period of 2009 to 2013, the G20 average at 0.40 in the same period and the BRICS average at 0.41 in the three years of the study 2011 to 2013. Although an upward trend in G20 and BRICS compliance scores is observed, their delivery on the commitments made is still considerably weaker than that of the G8.

Gx delivery legitimacy

To assess the G8, G20 and BRICS delivery legitimacy, compliance performance data were adjusted using sub-indicators of economic power and representativeness of the three institutions. The economic power sub-indicator reflects the G8, G20 and BRICS total GDP while the representativeness sub-indicator reflects the total population of their member countries. Figures for the EU are neglected in the cases of G8 and G20, as the nature of the EU's membership in these institutions differs from that of the other states. Data for GDP are PPP-based. Both GDP and population data are for the year 2013.

To "eliminate" the difference in the units of measurement the data are adjusted to a new common scale through a standard procedure of normalization⁶: sub-indicators showing relative economic power and representativeness of the institutions are calculated against the G8 PPP-based GDP and population data which are set to equal 1. G20 economic power and representativeness sub-indicators are respectively 2.02 and 4.87 times higher than those of G8. BRICS economic power sub-indicator (0.82) is less than that of the G8 and G20, while the representativeness sub indicator is 3.37. The integral indicator reflecting the G8, G20 and BRICS decisions implementation effectiveness in addressing global governance challenges is a product of the GDP and population sub-indicators. The integral indicators are 1, 9.83 and 2.76 for G8, G20 and BRICS respectively (Table 4).

⁶ Normalization originates from statistics, and eliminates the unit of measurement by transforming the data into new scores with a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1.

Table 4. G8, G20 and BRICS economic power and representativeness indicators

	GDP PPP, mln of international dollars	Population, people
Argentina	771000	41446246
Australia	1007353	23130900
Brazil	3012197	200361925
Canada	1520493	35158304
China	16157704	1357380000
France	2436930	66028467
Germany	3493479	80621788
India	6774441	1252139596
Indonesia	2388413	249865631
Italy	2052364	59831093
Japan	4624359	127338621
Korea	1664259	50219669
Mexico	2014006	122332399
Russia	3461259	143499861
Saudi Arabia	1550429	28828870
South Africa	662470	52981991
Turkey	1421881	74932641
United Kingdom	2320104	64097085
United States	16800000	316128839
G8	36708988	892704058
G20	74133141	4346323926
BRICS	30068071	3006363373
	Economic power sub indicator	Representativeness sub indicator
G8	1	1
G20	2.02	4.87
BRICS	0.82	3.37
	Integral indicator	
G8	1.00	
G20	9.83	
BRICS	2.76	

Source: World Bank

Average 2009-2013 compliance scores adjusted by the institutions economic power and representativeness indicator (Table 5) show that despite the relatively low level of compliance, G20 has got the highest capability to address global challenges effectively and legitimately. BRICS is comparatively strong in

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terms of representativeness, but weaker than G8 and G20 in terms of economic power. Although the institution delivery legitimacy indicator is higher than that of the G8, to successfully fulfil its mission of reforming the global system to better reflect the interests of developing countries and emerging economies, BRICS should ensure continued economic growth and strengthen compliance with the commitments made by the leaders. G8 legitimacy largely rests on the high level of compliance compared to other institutions. Given that economic power and representativeness of the G8 members are unlikely to increase in future, the institution should further strengthen its commitment to delivery. In this sense the transformation of the G8 into the G7 in 2014 was a step towards decreasing its capability as a global governance institution, on the one hand. On the other hand the cohesive G7 compliance for 2014 Brussels summit rose to 0.63, the highest in the study period. Given the limited data it is too early to make any conclusions on how and if the G7 would offset decline in its representativeness and economic power though an enhanced compliance performance.

Table 5. G7/8, G20 and BRICS compliance corrected for economic power and representativeness

	Compliance	Economic power sub indicator	Representativeness sub indicator	Integral indicator	Compliance, corrected for economic power	Compliance, corrected for representativeness	Delivery legitimacy indicator
G8	0.54	1.00	1.00	1.00	0.54	0.54	0.54
G7 (2014)	0.67	0.91	0.84	0.76	0.61	0.56	0.51
G20	0.40	2.02	4.87	9.83	0.81	1.95	3.93
BRICS	0.41	0.82	3.37	2.76	0.34	1.38	1.13

Conclusion

Delivery on the G8, G20 and BRICS commitments is vital for strengthening the legitimacy of these institutions and effectively addressing their priorities. The analysis of compliance revealed that that over the period of the Gx summit coexistence, the G8 demonstrated higher capacity for the delivery on its commitments than the G20 and BRICS with the G8 average of 0.54 over the period of 2009 to 2013, the G20 average of 0.40 in the same period and the BRICS average of 0.41 in the three years from 2011 to 2013. Although an

upward trend in G20 and BRICS compliance scores is observed, their delivery on the commitments made is still considerably weaker than that of the G8. This can be explained by the fact that both BRICS and G20 members have differing national priorities and domestic economic circumstances, which prevent them from fully implementing the agreed decisions. Thus, these institutions have to strengthen their accountability and coordination mechanisms to enhance their compliance performance.

Analysis also proves the effectiveness of the division of labour between the Gx, as, for example, G8 delivers better on commitments related to political issues, G20 compliance is relatively higher in the macroeconomic area, and BRICS demonstrate good compliance performance on development and energy.

At the same time, given the impact Gx representativeness and economic power have on global governance, they factored into the assessment of delivery legitimacy. Gx compliance performance data adjusted by representativeness and economic power indicators provide useful insights. The G20's delivery legitimacy is the highest among the three institutions (3.93) due to its substantial economic potential and representativeness. Taking into account economic and demographic forecasts, the G20 is likely to retain its leading role in future global economic governance. The G8's decision implementation effectiveness for addressing key global governance issues declines as the result of the institution's decreasing share in the global economy and world population. Its delivery legitimacy stands at 0.54. The G8's strength is the highest compliance performance level of all three institutions. The indicator for BRICS delivery legitimacy is 1.13. BRICS should collectively and individually consolidate efforts to strengthen economic growth. They also need to enhance compliance with collectively made decisions.

Thus, the approach used in this article allows integrating compliance data and factors of economic and demographic capabilities of the three institutions in the assessment of their delivery legitimacy.

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