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THE WORLD BANK

PURSUING STRONG, SUSTAINABLE AND BALANCED GROWTH: A NOTE ON G20 STRUCTURAL REFORM COMMITMENTS

September 2013

At the Pittsburgh Summit in September 2009, leaders of the Group of Twenty (G20) economies agreed to work together to promote an enduring recovery, and strong and sustainable medium-term growth. This included the Framework for Strong, Sustainable, and Balanced Growth with a Mutual Assessment Process (MAP) through which G20 countries: (i) identify objectives for the global economy, (ii) agree on the policies required to achieve these objectives; and (iii) assess progress towards meeting the objectives.

The MAP covers three critical areas for delivering Strong, Sustainable and Balanced Growth: fiscal policies, monetary and exchange rate policies, and structural policies. At the request of the G20, the OECD jointly with the World Bank provide technical analysis to help evaluate the appropriateness of countries' structural policy commitments, and the progress towards implementing the reforms. This note assesses the implementation of the Los Cabos structural policy commitments and evaluates the nature and strength of the commitments in the St. Petersburg Action Plan.¹

Key points

- Implementation of nearly all of the Los Cabos commitments is under way and 22% of committed measures are assessed to be completed.
- The St. Petersburg commitments cover a wide range of structural reforms with a strong focus on product market regulation, financial regulation and to a lesser extent labour market institutions.
- The G20 has made some progress in streamlining the St. Petersburg structural reform commitments compared with earlier Action Plans as most countries have stated no more than the agreed 5 commitments: 3 new commitments and 2 restated commitments from Los Cabos.
- However, many commitments consist of several sub-commitments and, when these are “unbundled”, the average number of “unbundled” commitments per country has not changed significantly relative to the Los Cabos round.
- Progress in implementing commitments in the St. Petersburg Action Plan will be easier to assess than in previous rounds as more commitments represent clear, observable policy intentions, rather than referring to general objectives or wide-ranging strategic plans. However, there remains considerable room for future improvement.
- A significant proportion of the “new” commitments relate to actions that are already well advanced, suggesting scope to raise the level of ambition of new commitments that are made.
- The St. Petersburg commitments are generally assessed as contributing to the G20 objectives of Strong, Sustainable and Balanced Growth, with strong growth by far the dominant theme.
- The St Petersburg commitments have a moderate degree of overlap with the OECD's 5 country-specific *Going for Growth* structural policy priorities, suggesting that many priority areas are being addressed but that some are not being targeted by G20 commitments.

¹ A separate note, annexed to this one, provides the detail of the World Bank's assessment of new St. Petersburg commitments made by those G20 member countries that are emerging economies.


1. The implementation of Los Cabos commitments

The Los Cabos commitments made in 2012 have been assessed in terms of implementation over the past year, where progress is scored either as pending (no significant action taken), ongoing or complete.

Some of the commitments as stated by countries have a clear multipart form and include several distinct sub-commitments. In other cases, although the commitment itself is stated in general terms, additional information provided in the templates submitted by countries shows that the commitments as stated cover multiple specific commitments. The analysis in this note therefore focusses on “unbundled” commitments – derived by separating the commitments stated by countries into their separate parts - rather than the commitments specified in Action Plan templates.²

There is partial or complete implementation of nearly all of the Los Cabos commitments on an unbundled basis. 22% of commitments are fully implemented (Figure 1). Progress towards the large majority of commitments is considered to be ongoing. However, this categorisation partly reflects the nature of the commitments, which in many cases makes it hard to categorise them as either pending or complete – something has usually been done in line with the commitment but not enough to say that the commitment has been fully implemented

Figure 1. Implementation of unbundled Los Cabos commitments




Source: G20 country templates and OECD calculations.

The implementation review shows that progress is fairly diverse across policy areas (Figure 2). The policy area where progress towards completion is most advanced is taxation, where implementation is assessed as complete for 44% of committed measures. More limited completion is found in other policy areas, especially human capital and product market regulation. In all policy areas, there has been action of some sort (completed or ongoing) for the bulk of the commitments. There is just one commitment where progress is pending, meaning that no action has been taken to implement the commitment.


² See Appendix 1 for a description of “unbundled commitments” as against the commitments stated in the templates.

Figure 2. Implementation of unbundled Los Cabos commitments by broad policy area



Source: G20 country templates and OECD calculations.

Figure 3. Implementation of unbundled Los Cabos commitments by country




Source: G20 country templates and OECD calculations.

At the country level, countries broadly speaking fall into three categories in terms of progress on implementation of Los Cabos commitments (Figure 3). For five countries (China, India, Mexico, Russia, and the United States), all commitments are assessed as ongoing, while for Indonesia one is pending while all others are ongoing. A second group has a small number of completed commitments with the rest generally ongoing. Finally, a few countries, including France, Italy, Korea, Argentina and Australia, have completed a substantial proportion of their Los Cabos commitments. Given differences in the degree of ambition and assessability of the commitments, these results should not directly be interpreted as indicating how much effort countries have made in structural reforms to achieve Strong, Sustainable and Balanced Growth.

2. The St. Petersburg Action Plan commitments

The St. Petersburg Action Plan includes a new set of structural reform commitments by countries. The commitments comprise a wide range of structural reform measures to achieve Strong, Sustainable and Balanced Growth (Figure 4). These include policies covering product market regulations, labour market regulations, taxation, human capital, financial regulation and a number of other areas, such as the housing sector, investment in infrastructure and green growth policies. An overview of the coverage of the commitments by country and policy area is shown in Table 1. Product market and financial reforms, and to a lesser extent labour institutions, are the main focus areas of the commitments.

Figure 4. Unbundled structural policy commitments by broad policy area



Source: G20 country templates and OECD calculations.

Compared to the Los Cabos Action Plan, there has been a shift in the the St. Petersburg commitments towards product market reforms and away from financial regulation. This may in part reflect the fact that considerable action has been taken since the crisis on reforms to enhance financial stability.

Table 1. Coverage of St. Petersburg unbundled commitments by policy area

| | Argentina | Australia | Brazil | Canada | China | Germany | European Union | France | India | Indonesia | Italy | Japan | Korea | Mexico | Russian Fed. | Saudi Arabia | South Africa | Spain | Turkey | United Kingdom | United States |
|--|-----------|-----------|--------|--------|-------|---------|----------------|--------|-------|-----------|-------|-------|-------|--------|--------------|--------------|--------------|-------|--------|----------------|---------------|
| Product market regulation | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Strengthen competition in network industries | | ✓ | | | | ✓ | | ✓ | ✓ | | ✓ | | | | ✓ | | | | | | |
| Reform/simplify product market regulations | | | | | | | | ✓ | | | ✓ | | | | | | | | ✓ | | |
| Reduce barriers to competition in the services sector | | | | | | | | | | | | | ✓ | | | | | | | | |
| Reduce barriers to foreign ownership/investment/trade | | | | ✓ | | | | | ✓ | | | ✓ | | ✓ | | | | | | | |
| Reduce regulatory barriers to competition | | | | | | | ✓ | | | | ✓ | | ✓ | | | | | | ✓ | | |
| Reduce state control over economic activity or public ownership | | | | | | | | ✓ | | | ✓ | | | | | | | | | | |
| Reform planning regulations | | | | | | | | | | | | | ✓ | | ✓ | | | | | | ✓ |
| Other | | | | | | | | | | | | | | ✓ | ✓ | | | | | | |
| Labour market regulation | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Reform (disability) benefit schemes | | ✓ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | ✓ |
| Reform the unemployment insurance scheme | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Reduce restrictions on labour mobility | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | ✓ | | | | | | |
| Reduce/moderate the minimum cost of labour | | | | | | | | ✓ | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Reduce/ease job protection | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | ✓ |
| Reform the wage bargaining system | | | | | | | | ✓ | | | ✓ | | | | | | | | | | |
| Strengthen policies to support female labour force participation | | | | | | | | | | | | ✓ | ✓ | | | | | | | | ✓ |
| Improve incentives for (formal) labour force participation | | | | | | | | | | | ✓ | | | | | | | | | | ✓ |
| Other | | | | | ✓ | | | | | | | | ✓ | | | | | | ✓ | | |
| Taxation | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Reform/strengthen the structure of taxation | | ✓ | | | | | | ✓ | | | | | | | | | | | | | ✓ |
| Reduce implicit taxes on continued work at older ages | | | | | | | | ✓ | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Reduce the (average) tax wedge on labour income | | | | | | | | | | | ✓ | | | | | | | | | | |
| Shift toward indirect taxes | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Reduce impediments to full-time female participation | | ✓ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Phase out energy subsidies | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Other | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | ✓ |
| Human capital | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Improve educational efficiency/outcomes/achievement | | ✓ | | ✓ | | ✓ | ✓ | | | | ✓ | | | ✓ | | | | | | ✓ | ✓ |
| Strengthen early education | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | ✓ | | | | |
| Strengthen primary education | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | ✓ | | | | |
| Strengthen secondary education | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | ✓ | | | | |
| Reform/strengthen tertiary education | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | ✓ | | | | |
| Promote social mobility | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Other | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Financial regulation | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Improve/streamline financial regulation | ✓ | | | ✓ | ✓ | | ✓ | | | | | | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |
| Undertake wide-ranging financial reforms | ✓ | | | | ✓ | | ✓ | | | ✓ | | | | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | | | | | ✓ |
| Other | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Other areas | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Reduce producer support to agriculture | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Improve public sector efficiency | | | | | | | | | | | ✓ | | | | ✓ | | | | | | |
| Improve health outcomes | | | | | ✓ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Reduce health care costs | | | | | | | | | | | | ✓ | | | | | | | | | ✓ |
| Strengthen R&D and innovation incentives | | | ✓ | | ✓ | ✓ | | | | | | ✓ | | | | | | | | | |
| Strengthen the legal system | | | | | | | | | | | ✓ | | ✓ | | | | | | | | |
| Improve infrastructure/quality | | | ✓ | ✓ | | | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | | | | ✓ | | ✓ | ✓ | | | ✓ | ✓ |
| Other | ✓ | | | | | | | | ✓ | | | | | ✓ | | ✓ | | ✓ | ✓ | | |
| Extra areas | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Equity and income distribution issues | | | ✓ | | ✓ | | | | ✓ | ✓ | | | | ✓ | ✓ | | | | | | |
| Green growth issues | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | ✓ |
| Other | | | | | ✓ | | ✓ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | ✓ |


Source: G20 country templates.

3. The assessability of the structural reform commitments

One aim of the G20 in the St. Petersburg Round was to make policy commitments that are clearly defined and where progress can be easily assessed, avoiding long lists of already on-going initiatives.

To that end, countries were each asked to submit no more than 3 new commitments and to restate no more than 2 priority commitments from the Los Cabos Action Plan. Thus, the maximum total number of commitments per country would be 5. In practice, countries stated on average 2.7 new commitments and 3 restated commitments in the country templates, for an overall average of 5.8 commitments per country. Three countries submitted fewer than 5 total commitments, while 8 submitted more than 5 (Figure 5).


Figure 5. Number of new, restated and total St. Petersburg commitments as stated by countries



Source: G20 country templates.

However, the total number of unbundled commitments basis – taking into account multipart commitments – in the St. Petersburg Action Plan is around 10 per country on average (Figure 6), roughly unchanged since the Los Cabos round. Encouragingly, 8 countries have fewer unbundled commitments in the St. Petersburg round than at Los Cabos. Progress towards streamlining the number of commitments has therefore been only partial.

Figure 6. Number of St. Petersburg commitments by country, as stated by countries and on an unbundled basis




Source: G20 country templates and OECD calculations.

A further shortcoming of earlier rounds of structural policy commitments was that commitments were often expressions of general objectives, or referred to broad strategic plans covering many measures and long time periods. This makes it difficult to assess whether a commitment has been implemented as there may be no clear benchmark. Commitments can be scored by whether they are “assessable”, or whether they refer to general objectives or wide-ranging strategic action plans.


About half of St. Petersburg commitments – on an unbundled basis – are judged to be assessable with most of the others referring to general objectives that lack enough detail on specific policy measures (Figure 7). This is slightly better than in the Los Cabos round. Encouragingly, new commitments made by countries in the St. Petersburg round appear to be more assessable than the restated Los Cabos commitments.

Figure 7. Assessability of unbundled St. Petersburg commitments

A. Los Cabos and St. Petersburg commitments




B. St. Petersburg commitments



Source: G20 country templates and OECD calculations.

The assessability of commitments remains quite variable across countries. Almost all countries make at least some assessable commitments, but in just one case (Australia) are all commitments evaluated as assessable (Figure 8), so that further progress would be needed in future action plans to improve the assessability and thereby allow better monitoring of commitments.


Figure 8. Country-by-country assessability scores, all unbundled commitments



Source: G20 country templates and OECD calculations.

The St. Petersburg round aimed to make policy commitments more forward-looking, avoiding a listing of old measures already underway or even fully implemented. Nonetheless, about one in seven unbundled St. Petersburg commitments is assessed as already substantially completed (Figure 9). Unsurprisingly, the proportion is higher for those commitments that have been restated from the Los Cabos round (26%), but even for the new commitments about 11% are evaluated to be substantially implemented.

Figure 9. Number of unbundled St. Petersburg commitments that are already substantially implemented




Source: G20 country templates and OECD calculations.

4. Contributions of commitments to Strong, Sustainable and Balanced Growth

The St. Petersburg structural reform commitments are assessed as generally contributing to the G20 objectives of Strong, Sustainable and Balanced Growth (SSBG). Almost all of the St. Petersburg commitments (94%) were scored as contributing to these objectives, primarily with the objective to strengthen growth (Figure 10). This is broadly in line with the Los Cabos commitments.³ For the first time, some countries have articulated in the templates how they see their St. Petersburg commitments as contributing to G20 objectives. Only a few countries did this systematically, but nearly half included some explicit reference to how at least one of their commitments was seen as contributing to SSBG.

Figure 10. Contribution of St. Petersburg commitments to SSB growth




Source: G20 country templates and OECD calculations.

Many structural reforms can contribute to achieving multiple objectives, including not only stronger growth but also other SSBG objectives, such as reducing current account imbalances and dealing with social challenges. Nearly a third of the St. Petersburg commitments contribute to more than one of the SSBG objectives. While the distribution of commitments by contribution to SSBG objectives looks similar whether one looks only at the primary contribution or whether multiple contributions are allowed for (Figure 11), it is noticeable that the incidence of measures contributing to social and environmental sustainability is higher relative to other categories when multiple contributions are allowed for. This suggests that social/environmental goals are often included in commitments, but not as the primary objective.

³ Although about a quarter of all commitments are in the area of financial sector reform, Figure 10 shows that the proportion of commitments primarily aimed at financial stability is much lower. Many of the financial sector commitments are aimed at stronger growth (e.g. by increasing credit to SMEs) rather than stability.

Figure 11. Contribution of unbundled St. Petersburg commitments to SSBG objectives



Source: G20 country templates and OECD calculations.

An important question is how far the reform commitments are likely to contribute to meeting the G20 objectives of Strong, Sustainable and Balanced Growth. Although it is impossible to assess accurately the full impact of the specific reform measures in the St. Petersburg Action Plan, empirical analysis does suggest that reforms can have significant quantitative impacts on economic performance and boost growth for some time while these gains are realised (Box 1).

Box 1. Indicative growth benefits of selected structural reforms

Structural policy settings – such as product market regulations, labour market institutions, tax systems, support for innovation and education policy – have an impact on long-run economic performance. Implementing best-practice policies and removing obstacles to growth and employment can raise the long-run trend output of the economy, and increase growth over a period of years as the economy adjusts.

There is an extensive empirical literature estimating the size of the growth effects of various structural policies. Based on a selection of recent OECD work, some indicative quantification of the expected impact on potential growth of selected types of reforms for G20 countries can be provided.

Product market reforms

Product market regulations that act as obstacles to competition, productivity and employment include legal and administrative barriers to entry of new firms, state control of businesses, and regulatory barriers to international trade and investment. The OECD's product market regulation (PMR) indices provide a measure of these barriers in 30 OECD countries, as well as in Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, Russia and South Africa. Their construction aims for consistency across time and countries.

Estimates in Boursès et al. (2010) imply that the regulatory burden as measured by the PMR indices has a negative impact on growth of total factor productivity, with a larger effect for countries and sectors closer to the technological frontier. As an example, reforms that would reduce the OECD's PMR indices by an amount equivalent to the average total reduction across OECD countries between 2000 and 2007 would increase average annual total factor productivity and GDP growth by about 0.7 percentage points over 10 years for the average G20 country.

Labour market reforms

Job creation, employment and formality can be enhanced through reforms to labour market institutions such as taxation and social welfare systems, education and training, wage setting mechanisms and employment protection legislation. These policies also affect the productivity of workers and the ability of the economy to reallocate workers to the most productive firms.

For example, employment protection legislation – rules that govern individual dismissal of workers, collective dismissals and regulation of temporary contracts – can have impacts on employment of different types of worker and strict regulations can reduce productivity by hindering the efficient reallocation of labour. The OECD's indicators of employment protection legislation (EPL) measure the tightness of policy settings across countries. Estimates by Bassanini et al. (2009) indicate a significant negative effect of EPL restrictiveness on labour productivity. The marginal impact of reforms that would lower the OECD's EPL index by the same amount as achieved on average by OECD countries that undertook reforms between 2000 and 2008 would be to raise the average annual growth of labour productivity by 1.6% over 10 years for G20 countries.

Increasing the share of consumption and property taxes in total taxation

The structure of taxation affects long-run output. Arnold (2008) finds that taxes on property and consumption are more growth-friendly than income taxes, especially corporate profits tax. Based on these results, reducing the share of total tax revenues accounted for by taxes on income, profits and capital gains, social security contributions and taxes on payroll by 3 percentage points - the median change for OECD countries over the past three decades (Bouis et al., 2012) - would raise productivity by about 1% in the long run.

5. G20 structural reform commitments vis-à-vis priorities identified in the OECD's *Going for Growth* exercise

Even if G20 structural commitments contribute to the objective of Strong, Sustainable and Balanced Growth, it may say little about whether the highest priority measures have been selected.

Well-prioritised G20 commitments must address the key policy challenges in the most effective way. One way of getting an idea of the extent to which the St. Petersburg commitments correspond to the areas seen as the most important is to compare them with the OECD's five country-specific *Going for Growth* structural policy priorities.

The 2013 *Going for Growth* priorities for individual countries are listed in Appendix 2, together with an indication of which of these priorities overlap with policy areas covered by G20 commitments.


In the OECD's *Going for Growth* exercise, 5 priority measures are identified on the basis of areas where a country performs relatively poorly and is relatively far from policy best practice. The OECD's 5 chosen priorities are primarily designed to boost growth, via either increased labour utilisation or faster labour productivity growth, although other objectives are taken into account.⁴ Furthermore, most G20 structural policy commitments are in fact primarily aimed at achieving stronger growth. Thus, comparing the *Going for Growth* priorities with the new commitments can provide some indication about overlaps and gaps vis-à-vis the priorities for achieving G20 objectives.

Figure 12 shows the degree of overlap between detailed policy areas covered in the St. Petersburg structural policy commitments and those covered by the five priorities identified in *Going for Growth*.

⁴ Chapter 2 *Going for Growth* 2013 considers side effects of recommendations on other policy goals (OECD, 2013).

- The lowest two bars for each country represent the five OECD priorities with the dark blue bars indicating cases where there is an overlap between the policy area covered by these priorities and the policy areas covered by G20 commitments, and the light grey bars designating priorities identified by the OECD where the policy area in question is not covered by any of the G20 commitments of the country in question.
- The light blue bars at the top designate G20 commitments where the policy area covered is not covered by any of the OECD's *Going for Growth* priorities.

Figure 12. Correspondence between coverage of policy areas of unbundled St. Petersburg commitments and OECD *Going for Growth* priorities



Source: G20 country templates, *Going for Growth 2013* and OECD calculations.

There are 23 *Going for Growth* priorities which cover policy areas also covered by G20 commitments, meaning that around a quarter of the priorities identified by the OECD are taken up.⁵ These cover 12 detailed policy areas, with the highest overlap in the liberalisation of FDI regimes, reducing regulatory barriers to competition, improving educational outcomes, boosting labour force participation, financial sector reform, raising the quality of public administration and enhancing infrastructure.

The remaining 72 *Going for Growth* priorities do not overlap with St. Petersburg commitments in terms of policy area coverage. These gaps cover 17 detailed policy areas, spanning the full range of the broad policy areas. Policy areas where *Going for Growth* priorities are not reflected in G20 commitments include easing product market regulation; removing barriers to labour mobility and reforming employment protection regulation; tax reforms reducing the tax wedge on labour and cutting energy subsidies; strengthening of early, primary and tertiary education; and a variety of other reforms such as , strengthening the rule of law, reducing producer support to agriculture, and improving health outcome.

The moderate degree of overlap between the G20 and OECD *Going for Growth* priorities suggests some scope for identifying commitments that are more favourable for growth than current commitments.

⁵ *Going for Growth* does not make recommendations for Argentina and Saudi Arabia.

References

Arnold, J. (2008), “Do Tax Structures Affect Aggregate Economic Growth? Empirical Evidence from a Panel of OECD Countries”, *OECD Economics Department Working Papers*, No. 643.

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Appendix 1 Methodology

i. Unbundling composite commitments

The number of commitments in the G20 St. Petersburg Action plan template is 121 (64 restated and 57 new). However, the analysis in this note is based on total of 206 “unbundled” commitments (85 restated and 121 new). Countries’ commitments are unbundled when they are judged to contain several distinct commitments:

- Some of the commitments articulated by countries have a clear multi-part form. If commitments are broken down following these indications, it gives rise to an additional 43 commitments (22 new and 21 restated) with the result that the total number of new and restated commitments rises from 121 to 164.
- In some cases, the commitment as stated is rather general, but the objectives or update on progress included in the template (or in the previous template for restated commitments) provide specific information that is suggestive of a more concrete set of commitments. In the OECD’s analysis, reformulating the commitments in this way gives rise to a further 42 commitments, relating to five countries (Italy, Korea, Russia, Spain and Turkey). Thus the total number of “unbundled” commitments rises further, to 206.

Unbundling was done for 17 countries – only in the cases of Argentina, Canada, Germany and the United States was the number of commitments left unchanged from the number stated in the template by the country. The number of additional commitments arising from unbundling ranges from zero in these cases to a maximum of 16 in the case of Turkey.

ii. Assessing implementation

Progress made towards implementation has been scored based in part on information supplied by countries relating to restated commitments (in principle at most 2 per country), supplemented by the assessment of OECD and World Bank country specialists, using a similar approach to that applied to earlier rounds of G20 commitments. As in the past, an important caveat to this exercise is that the general nature of many commitments complicates the task of assessing implementation, but all commitments have been scored either as pending (no significant action taken), ongoing or complete.

iii. Assessing “assessability”

All bundled commitments have been scored according to how concrete they are and whether it would be possible in principle to assess whether they had been implemented. Assessable commitments refer to specific concrete policy measures, for which it is possible to say whether the measure has been implemented. Other commitments are scored as referring either to general objectives or overarching strategic plans, which have many different policy measures, making it difficult to evaluate objectively how much progress has been made on the overall plan.

iv. Assessing contributions to the G20 objectives of Strong, Sustainable and Balanced Growth

The contributions to the different SSBG objectives have been assessed based on an overview of the relevant empirical literature on the links between policies and their impact. As regards the objective of stronger growth, many structural policies are known to have a positive impact on one or both of labour productivity and employment. Examples include all the sub-headings under the headings of product market regulation, labour market regulation, taxation, human capital, financial regulation and other in Table 1. Work has also been done (see OECD, 2013) to assess the impact of many of these policies on other policy objectives – this is summarised in the table below:

| | Income distribution | Environment | Budget balance (short run) | Current account (short run) |
|--|---------------------|-------------|----------------------------|-----------------------------|
| Raising labour force participation | | | | |
| Reforming of tax and benefits (childcare) | + | | - | - |
| Extending social protection (UI benefits and health) | + | | - | - |
| Postponing retirement age | +/- | | + | - |
| Reducing benefit entitlement (UI benefits) | - | | + | + |
| Reducing unemployment | | | | |
| Raising spending on ALMPs | + | | - | |
| Reforming minimum wage and EPL | - | | | |
| Investing in human and physical capital | | | | |
| Increasing quality and access to basic education | + | | - | |
| Raising investment in infrastructure and R&D | | +/- | - | - |
| Boosting competition and efficiency | | | | |
| Easing product market regulation | +/- | +/- | | - |
| Phasing-out subsidies (housing, energy, agric.) | +/- | + | + | |
| Shifting taxation from direct to indirect bases | - | + | | + |
| Reducing tax expenditures | + | +/- | + | |

More generally, policies to raise national saving (and/or to counter overinvestment, where relevant) will, other things being equal, reduce current account deficits for countries where these are deemed excessive. By the same token, for countries with excessive current account surpluses, policies to boost consumption or investment will tend to move the current account position in the right direction.

In a few cases, commitments were assessed as making no clear contribution to the SSBG objectives. A no-contribution score may be either because the policy measure appeared to be roughly orthogonal to the SSBG objectives or because the link to the relevant objective is contentious (e.g. subsidies for particular industries as a growth measure).

Appendix 2. OECD 2013 *Going for Growth* priorities

This table summarises the policy areas identified by the OECD in *Going for Growth* 2013 (OECD, 2013). Areas not covered by the St. Petersburg commitments (“gaps”) are shaded in grey.

| Country | Going for Growth 2013 priorities. Priorities for which the policy area in question is not covered by a St.Petersburg commitment of that country are shaded in grey. |
|----------------|--|
| Australia | 1 Improve the efficiency of the tax system. General consumption tax burden is relatively low while headline company tax is comparatively high for a capital-importing country like Australia |
| | 2 Relax barriers to foreign direct investment. Screening procedures on foreign direct investment are comparatively stringent. |
| | 3 Enhance capacity and regulation in infrastructure. |
| | 4 Improve performance of early childhood education. |
| | 5 Enhance innovation policy. |
| Brazil | 1 Enhance outcomes and equity in education. |
| | 2 Improve incentives for formal labour force participation, especially among seniors. |
| | 3 Reduce distortions in the tax system and lower the labour tax wedge. |
| | 4 Increase private investment in infrastructure and remove remaining barriers. |
| | 5 Improve the efficiency of financial markets. |
| Canada | 1 Reduce barriers to entry and enhance capacity in network sectors and professional services. |
| | 2 Reduce barriers to foreign direct investment. |
| | 3 Reform the tax system. |
| | 4 Enhance tertiary education outcomes. |
| | 5 Improve R&D support policies. |
| China | 1 Open the state-controlled sector to private investment. |
| | 2 Enhance outcomes and equity in education. |
| | 3 Ease government controls over financial markets. |
| | 4 Reduce barriers to labour mobility. |
| | 5 Further enhance the rule of law. |
| European Union | 1 Increase competition in network industries. |
| | 2 Increase competition in the services sector. |
| | 3 Reduce producer support to agriculture. |
| | 4 Reform regulation to create a more stable and integrated financial system. |
| | 5 Remove barriers to labour mobility within the EU. |
| France | 1 Reform job protection and strengthen active labour market policies. |
| | 2 Shift the tax burden away from labour, and continue to reduce the minimum cost of labour. |
| | 3 Improve equity and outcomes in primary and secondary education |
| | 4 Reduce regulatory barriers to competition. |
| | 5 Improve the quality and efficiency of tertiary education |
| Germany | 1 Reduce tax wedges on labour income and shift taxation towards less distortive sources. |
| | 2 Improve tertiary education outcomes. |
| | 3 Reduce regulatory barriers to competition, especially in the services sector. |
| | 4 Ease job protection for regular workers. |
| | 5 Remove obstacles to full-time female labour participation. |
| India | 1 Enhance effectiveness in the education system. |
| | 2 Reform employment protection legislation. |
| | 3 Reduce trade and FDI barriers. |
| | 4 Promote more effective infrastructure-related regulation. |
| | 5 Undertake wide-ranging financial sector reforms. |
| Indonesia | 1 Enhance outcomes and equity in education. |
| | 2 Improve the regulatory environment for infrastructure. |
| | 3 Reform labour regulation and cap minimum wage increases to address the problem of informality. |
| | 4 Reduce energy subsidies. |
| | 5 Ease barriers to entrepreneurship and investment and strengthen institutions to fight corruption. |

| Country | Going for Growth 2013 priorities. Priorities for which the policy area in question is not covered by a St.Petersburg commitment of that country are shaded in grey. |
|----------------|---|
| Italy | 1 Pursue rebalancing of protection from jobs to workers' income. |
| | 2 Improve equity and efficiency in education. |
| | 3 Improve the efficiency of the tax structure. |
| | 4 Reduce barriers to competition. |
| | 5 Enhance active labour market policies. |
| Japan | 1 Ease barriers to entry for domestic and foreign firms in the services sector. |
| | 2 Reduce producer support to agriculture |
| | 3 Improve the efficiency of the tax system. |
| | 4 Strengthen policies to support female labour force participation. |
| | 5 Reform job protection and upgrade training programmes. |
| Korea | 1 Reduce barriers to entry for domestic and foreign firms in network industries and services. |
| | 2 Strengthen policies to support female labour force participation. |
| | 3 Reform employment protection to reduce labour market duality. |
| | 4 Improve the efficiency of tax system by relying more on indirect taxes. |
| | 5 Reduce producer support to agriculture. |
| Mexico | 1 Raise education achievement. |
| | 2 Reduce job protection on formal contracts. |
| | 3 Reduce barriers to foreign direct investment. |
| | 4 Improve the rule of law. |
| | 5 Reduce barriers to entry and competition. |
| Russian Fed. | 1 Lower barriers to foreign direct investment. |
| | 2 Reduce state control over economic activity and other barriers to competition. |
| | 3 Raise the effectiveness of innovation policy. |
| | 4 Raise the quality of public administration. |
| | 5 Reform the health care system. |
| Spain | 1 Improve educational attainment in secondary education and access to tertiary education. |
| | 2 Improve active labour market policies. |
| | 3 Make wages more responsive to economic and firm-specific conditions. |
| | 4 Reduce the gap in job protection between temporary and permanent contracts. |
| | 5 Lower entry barriers in services industries. |
| South Africa | 1 Raise efficiency and equity in education. |
| | 2 Enhance competition in network industries. |
| | 3 Reduce barriers to entrepreneurship. |
| | 4 Strengthen active labour market policies to tackle youth unemployment. |
| | 5 Reform the wage bargaining system. |
| Turkey | 1 Improve educational achievement at all levels. |
| | 2 Reduce the cost of employment of the low-skilled. |
| | 3 Reform employment protection legislation. |
| | 4 Improve competition in network industries and agriculture. |
| | 5 Reduce incentives for early retirement. |
| United Kingdom | 1 Improve outcomes and equity in education. |
| | 2 Improve public infrastructure, especially for transport. |
| | 3 Strengthen work incentives by reforming welfare and childcare policies. |
| | 4 Strengthen public sector efficiency. |
| | 5 Reform planning regulations. |
| United States | 1 Enhance active labour market policies. |
| | 2 Improve the efficiency of the healthcare sector. |
| | 3 Improve the efficiency of the tax system. |
| | 4 Increase access to high-quality primary and secondary education |
| | 5 Reduce producer support to agriculture. |